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NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Washington, D. C.



Scrap
(1/7/70) September 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Revision of ExCom-M-17 (*attached*)
(Dtd August 7, 1969)

Please substitute the attached revised pages 2 and 3 in ExCom-M-17. The revisions are indicated by broken underlining. With this revision, I consider the minutes to be formally approved as agreed at the August 15 ExCom.


F. Robert Naka
Executive Secretary

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Attachments
Revised pages 2 and 3
for ExCom-M-17

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ExCom-M-17

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- I. Issue: Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee consideration of the security and policy implications of SALT with respect to the NRP?

Dr. McLucas introduced the subject of the impact of the SALT negotiations on the NRP. Background material had been previously distributed [REDACTED]

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Mr. Nitze stated that Mr. Gerard Smith, head of the SALT delegation, had asked the CIA to provide guidelines on the various levels of sensitivity associated with our collection capabilities. He said he had read the paper yesterday and it was very good. The NRP was well covered in the paper. As for the SALT negotiations, his impression is that during our talks with the Russians we are to discuss verification last and that in connection with its initial position the delegation has been instructed to state the willingness of the United States to rely on "national means" to the maximum extent possible. If the discussion proceeds beyond that, then the delegation must return for instructions. As a consequence, the NRO and other interested parties should have plenty of time to consider this matter further.

Mr. Helms confirmed the content of the CIA report. He further said that the inspection satellite question should not be brought up because such negotiation would start us down the "slippery slope" and we must not [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Dr. DuBridge concurred, saying that NASA was going to have an earth resources satellite so why do we need another program. Mr. Packard said that there are two reasons why it may be desirable to have a verification satellite program:

1. It would indicate how we would verify that the terms of the Treaty are being met, and
2. It would symbolize a joint effort between NASA and the DOD.

Dr. McLucas pointed out that NASA has already sent a proposal on an inspection satellite to the NSSM 28 Committee and to the 303 Committee. Dr. Steininger pointed out that the current NASA time schedule for an earth resources satellite might be too late for SALT. The earth resources satellite plan calls for 300-foot resolution in 1971 or 1972.

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Dr. DuBridge suggested that the restriction of 20 meters' resolution which was placed on NASA three years ago could be relaxed considerably. Mr. Helms concurred.

Mr. Packard summarized the feeling of the ExCom that discussion of this subject with the NSAM 156 Committee would be premature and no action should be taken now.

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III. DOD Intelligence Programs Reorganization
Under Mr. Robert F. Froehlke

Dr. DuBridge raised the question of the Laird memorandum on reorganizing the DOD intelligence resources. Dr. DuBridge said that he had understood from Mr. Laird that he intended that the NRO not be affected. Mr. Packard replied that the idea was to organize the activities of NSA and DIA better but not affect activities which were working well, like the NRP. He said that he thought the proposed Executive Council would be made up of members of the NRP Executive Committee and a few others for the purpose of coordinating the DOD intelligence activities. However, the ExCom should continue to function as it has and so should the NRO.

F. Robert Naka
Secretary

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NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held August 7, 1969
Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E 928, The Pentagon
10 - 10:45 a.m.

Members Present

Mr. David Packard
Mr. Richard Helms
Dr. Lee A. DuBridge

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Science Advisor to the President

Others Present

Dr. John L. McLucas
Dr. F. Robert Naka

Director, National Reconnaissance
Office, Ex Officio
Secretary, NRP Executive Committee
Ex Officio

Mr. Paul H. Nitze
Dr. Donald Steininger

Member of the SALT Delegation
Office of the President's Science
Advisor

INTRODUCTION

The meeting was called to discuss the impact of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations on the National Reconnaissance Program. However, two additional subjects were covered:



The DOD intelligence programs reorganization under Mr. Robert F. Froehlke.

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Although I have taken more extensive notes, the following is a summary of the minutes of this meeting.

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MINUTES OF THE MEETING

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